Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130004-5

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

COUNTRY	Albania	REPORT	
SUBJECT	1. Resistance to the Regime 2. Dissensions and Deviations	DATE DISTR.	4 January 1955
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	

This is UNEVALUATED Information

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

25X1

1. No organized opposition to the regime exists in Albania. There are some isolated elements in the mountains, which are ineffective. The security system has made it impossible to organize opposition. There is much discontent with Communism among the people, and criticism of injustices, methods, and individual actions by Communists. It is not possible for anyone to express himself against the Regime anywhere outside his house or intimate circle. 25X1

2. A group of Communist officers and officials, with ranks from Lieutenant to Colonel, who were intellectuals among the oldest Partisan fighters, used to meet often and talk politics among themselves. They did not criticize Communism as a system, nor Sovietization, directly. They criticized individual actions, the personal interests and misbehaviour and incompetence of some of the high level officials who were uneducated, fools, and conceited. They complained that such people were at the top while more able men were below and had to do their work for them. 25X1

3. The tensions and cross-currents in the Party have been developing as a continuous process since the war. After 1944, the Soviet Union's influence in Albania was nominal compared to that of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs were very active in Albanian affairs. Reaction against Yugoslav influence was led by Mehmet Shehu, Nako Spiro and Liri Belishova prior to the 1948 break. Shehu was removed as Chief of Staff and assigned to the non-influential post of Ministry of Communications and accused of being "Anti-Yugoslav and anti-Soviet." Belishova lost her job and Spiro killed himself (or so it was reported). After the 1948 break, Enver Hoxha embarked on an opportunist policy of sitting on the fence and finally came out as a Moscow supporter.

SECRET - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC					

Distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".

Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130004-5

Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130004-5

Shehu was reinstated to his former position of influence.

4. The leadership, after the 1948 break, fell into the hands of Hoxha, with Shehu as strong man, L. Belishova, Bedri Spahiu and Tuk Jakova. The Albanian Workers" (Communist) Party underwent a change. Panid Kristo, Ramadan Citaku and Pullumb Pishnica were removed. In the eyes of the public, the real leaders of the country were Hoxha, Jakova, Spahiu and Shehu. Hoxha and Shehu however, were rivals for power. Hoxha had the support of Jakova, Spiro Koleka, Gogo Nushi, Kico Nfjela, Manol Konomi, and Theodor Heba. Shehu was supported by Hysni Kapo, Manush Myftiu, Kadri Hasbiu (an intimate friend), Vita Kapo, Josif Pashko, Elene Terezi, Maqo Como, Bilbil Klosi, Mihal Zicishti. Each leader still has his own group of followers in the Party, with others like Spahiu, to some extent Jakova, S. Bekteshi, Sh. Peci, B. Balluku, Rita Marko, showing more independence.

5. Hoxha was popularized by the Party; but he never possessed the military authority of Shehu. He never commanded a Partisan Brigade in the field but spent most of his time at headquarters during the war. Shehu roamed the country with his Brigade and became a military figure; all spoke of his terror and he became well known to the people of Albania.

6. As long as Hoxha is secretary of the Party, he should be considered as No. 1 in the hierarchy. In fact however, Shehu has more authority, and he always has been more impressive at Party meetings.

7. It was rumored in Tirana that the 1954 changes would be made in the government to implement the principle of collective leadership. Removing Hoxha is not a simple task. In 1953, Hoxha lost his positions as Commanding General of the Army and Minister of Foreign Affairs and now he is no longer Prime Minister. There will probably be other changes in five or six months, and it seems likely that Hoxha will be kicked out.

8. There has been no sign of Titoism or similar deviations since 1948. There have been, however, some instances of independent thought. Major General Gjin Marku, a capable and dynamic man with ambition, began to discredit General Beqir Balluku when he became Chief of Staff and also opposed M. Shehu. After the 1948 split, Marku came out as a Moscow supporter and tried to have the whole Party Central Committee removed on the grounds that it was pro-Tito. This action earned him many enemies and he was not elected to the new Politburo. In 1952, he was removed from his post as Director of Artillery and made Commandant of the E. Hoxha Military School. But he will rise again.

9. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] If there is now any attempt to reopen trade with the West it would not be due to an independent policy of Albania but because the Soviet Union has approved such a policy. 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130004-5